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IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD: GUN REGULATIONS
AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD
STEPHEN KIEHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
On Christmas Eve of 2002, Raymond Woollard and his family
were celebrating the holiday at their home in rural Maryland when
someone shattered a window and entered their house.1  Woollard re-
trieved his shotgun.2  A fight ensued, and the intruder wrestled the
gun away from him.3  The two struggled until Woollard’s son retrieved
another gun and neutralized the intruder until police arrived.4
The intruder, who turned out to be Woollard’s son-in-law,5 was
sentenced to three years probation and imprisoned after violating his
probation.6  Woollard, fearing for his and his family’s safety upon his
son-in-law’s release,7 applied for and received a state permit to wear,
carry, and transport a handgun.8  Maryland’s Handgun Permit Review
Board renewed the permit in 2005 but declined to renew the permit
again in 2009, finding that Woollard had not documented any threats
Copyright  2011 by Stephen Kiehl.
* Stephen Kiehl is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law,
where he is a staff member of the Maryland Law Review.  He wishes to thank Professor
Richard Boldt for his guidance in writing this Comment; his editors, Stephanie Bignon,
Anne Di Salvo, and Alexandra Millard, for their wisdom and patience; and his family and
friends.
1. Complaint at 4, Woollard v. Sheridan, No. JFM-10-2068, 2010 WL 5463109 (D. Md.
Dec. 29, 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Woollard, No. JFM-10-
2068, 2010 WL 5463109.
6. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.  The intruder later violated the terms of his proba- R
tion and ended up in prison. Id.
7. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 3. R
8. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.  Maryland is one of eight states in which officials have R
discretion to approve or reject individual applications to carry a handgun outside of the
home.  Lindsey Craven, Note, Where Do We Go from Here? Handgun Regulations in a Post-
Heller World, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 831, 845 & n.127 (2010).  The remaining states
are California, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.
Id.  These states typically require an individual to show good cause for carrying a firearm.
Id. at 845.
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beyond his residence that would require him to carry a gun.9  Wool-
lard filed suit in federal district court in 2010 asserting a violation of
his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms,10 relying on the
recent landmark cases of District of Columbia v. Heller11 and McDonald v.
City of Chicago.12
In Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense,13 and that the Sec-
ond Amendment applies against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.14  The Court circumscribed the holdings in these cases
by limiting the recognized right to the confines of the home,15 and by
offering assurances that many “longstanding”16 and “presumptively
lawful”17 gun regulations will continue to be valid.18 Heller cautioned,
“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited.”19  Despite the Court’s attempt to limit the holdings, Heller
and McDonald unleashed a flood of litigation.20  Lower courts have
9. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4, 5.  Maryland law allows the possession of guns in the R
home without a permit. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b)(6) (West 2002 & Supp.
2010).
10. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 6.  The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated R
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
12. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
13. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
14. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026; id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); see also infra note 81. R
15. Heller held that the Second Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  554 U.S.
at 635. McDonald stated, “[T]he Second Amendment protects the right to possess a hand-
gun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”  130 S. Ct. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
16. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
17. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
18. The Heller Court stated,
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full
scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifica-
tions on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626–27.  The Court added in a footnote, “We identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at
627 n.26.
19. Id. at 626.
20. See Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, Am. Constitution Soc’y, The Standardless Second
Amendment 1 (Oct. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20and%20Winkler%20
Standardless%20Second%20Amendment.pdf (noting that state and federal courts have
ruled on more than 200 Second Amendment challenges since Heller was decided in 2008).
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easily upheld laws that fall within the “presumptively lawful” and
“longstanding” regulatory measures condoned by Heller and McDon-
ald, including laws prohibiting felons21 and drug users22 from possess-
ing guns and laws prohibiting the carrying of guns in sensitive places
such as airplanes23 and parks.24
The first significant test of the impact of Heller and McDonald
comes in cases such as the case filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, Woollard v. Sheridan,25 in which the
challenged laws, such as prohibitions on carrying weapons, were not
included in the Supreme Court’s laundry list of presumptively lawful
regulations.  This Comment will explore how courts have handled gun
regulation challenges since Heller and how they have struggled to
adopt a standard of review for Second Amendment cases.26  This
Comment will then argue that courts should apply intermediate scru-
tiny in evaluating gun regulations that are short of absolute bans on
possession, and that prohibitions on carrying weapons do not impli-
cate the core constitutional right identified in Heller and McDonald of
possessing a gun in the home for self-defense.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before District of Columbia v. Heller, courts viewed the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a collective right.28  That
changed with Heller, when the Supreme Court for the first time recog-
nized an individual right to keep and bear arms.29  This Part traces
Second Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Heller, noting that
while courts used various standards of review, gun regulations were
almost always upheld.30  This Part then examines the Heller and Mc-
Donald decisions, their reasoning, and the narrow nature of their
21. E.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
22. E.g., United States v. Hendrix, No. 09-cr-56-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33756, at *1
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2010).
23. E.g., United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008).
24. E.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d,
No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
25. No. JFM-10-2068, 2010 WL 5463109 (D. Md. Dec. 29, 2010).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Second
Amendment affords only a collective right to own or possess guns or other firearms . . . .”),
abrogated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as recognized in United
States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d
370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Federal appellate courts have largely adopted the collective
right model.”), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
29. 554 U.S. at 595.
30. See infra Part II.A.
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holdings.31  Finally, this Part reviews how courts have handled Second
Amendment cases in the wake of Heller and McDonald, finding that
even as courts have not settled on a standard of review, they have con-
tinued to uphold a wide variety of gun regulations.32  This suggests, as
one scholar has observed, that “Heller’s bark is much worse than its
right.”33
A. The Second Amendment Before Heller: Protecting a Collective Right
to Arms
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, state and
federal courts largely took a collective rights view of the Second
Amendment, holding that it guaranteed the rights of states to organ-
ize militias and of individuals to keep weapons connected to militia
service.34  For instance, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1840 in-
terpreted the Second Amendment to have a military purpose and
held that the state could prohibit the wearing and keeping of arms
that did not “contribute to the common defence.”35  A century later,
in the 1939 case United States v. Miller,36 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the transport of short-bar-
reled shotguns, finding that such guns are not protected by the Sec-
ond Amendment because they have no “reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”37  The Miller
Court further stated that the “obvious purpose” of the Second Amend-
ment was “to assure the continuation and render possible the effec-
tiveness” of state militias.38
State and federal courts followed the Supreme Court’s lead in
taking a collectivist approach to the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms, upholding gun regulations in nearly all instances.39
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(observing that while most appellate courts have taken the collective rights approach, state
appellate courts “offer a more balanced picture,” with at least seven state appellate courts
endorsing an individual right to bear arms and at least ten following the collective rights
model), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
35. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159 (1840).
36. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
37. Id. at 178.
38. Id.
39. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 718 (2007)
(noting that from World War II to 2007, state courts had invalidated only six of the hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of gun control laws enacted in that period); see also United States v.
Cole, 276 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2003) (“The Miller decision was the last time the
Supreme Court considered the meaning of the Second Amendment, and for over six de-
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in affirming
a federal statute that banned the possession of machineguns, held
that “a federal criminal gun-control law does not violate the Second
Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to maintain a well-reg-
ulated militia.”40  Under the collectivist approach, courts also upheld
gun control laws prohibiting felons41 and individuals convicted of do-
mestic violence misdemeanors42 from possessing guns.
Concealed carry laws became prevalent in the early nineteenth
century as states tried to control violence and limit public dueling,
and the laws were upheld by the courts as important public safety mea-
sures.43  Nor were the laws seen as violating the Second Amendment.
The influential legal scholar John Norton Pomeroy, writing on the
Second Amendment in 1879, stated, “[T]his constitutional inhibition
is certainly not violated by laws forbidding persons to carry dangerous
or concealed weapons, or laws forbidding the accumulation of quanti-
ties of arms with the design to use them in a riotous or seditious man-
ner.”44  Prior to 1840, the state legislatures of Kentucky, Louisiana,
Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Virginia all
passed laws prohibiting the concealed carrying of weapons.45  State
courts in Arkansas,46 Georgia,47 Kansas,48 Tennessee,49 and West Vir-
ginia50 upheld these concealed carry laws.  One exception was the Su-
preme Court of Vermont, which in 1903 held that under the Vermont
cades since, the lower federal courts have uniformly interpreted the decision as holding
that the Amendment affords ‘a collective, rather than individual, right’ associated with the
maintenance of a regulated militia.” (quoting Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir.
1995))).
40. United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2001).
41. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 549 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
42. E.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1999).
43. Winkler, supra note 39, at 1569.  As the Supreme Court of West Virginia noted in R
State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891),
The presumption which the law establishes, that every man who goes armed
in the midst of a peaceable community is of vile character, and a criminal, is in
consonance with the common law, and is a perfectly just and proper presump-
tion, and one which ought to prevail in every community which aspires to be
called civilized.
Id. at 11.
44. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 152–53 (Boston, Houghton, Osgood and Co. 4th ed. 1879).
45. Clayton E. Cramer, Concealed Weapon Laws of the Early Republic 150–56 (May 1,
1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Sonoma State University) (on file with Ruben Salazar Li-
brary, Sonoma State University).
46. Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876).
47. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
48. City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 621 (Kan. 1905).
49. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161–62 (1840).
50. State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 12 (W. Va. 1891).
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Constitution, an individual has a right to carry a weapon, openly or
concealed, for self-defense.51
In 1897, the Supreme Court indicated that concealed carry laws
did not violate the Second Amendment.  Justice Brown, writing for
the Court in Robertson v. Baldwin,52 stated, “[T]he right of the people
to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the
carrying of concealed weapons.”53  State courts in New York,54 North
Carolina,55 Maryland,56 and elsewhere have upheld laws prohibiting
the carrying of weapons in public.  The Supreme Court of North Car-
olina, for instance, held that the right to bear arms is “subject to rea-
sonable regulation,” including concealed carry prohibitions, in order
to preserve public peace and safety.57
Courts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries generally used
rational basis review or a reasonableness test when evaluating gun reg-
ulations.58  The reasonableness test asks “whether the challenged law
51. State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 610 (Vt. 1903) (“The people of the state have a right
to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state.”).
52. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
53. Id. at 281–82.
54. Moore v. Gallup, 267 A.D. 64, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943), aff’d, 294 N.Y. 699 (1945).
55. State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 11–12 (N.C. 1968).
56. Onderdonk v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 44 Md. App. 132, 135, 407 A.2d 763,
764 (1979).
57. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d at 10.
58. See Lindsay Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a
Standard for the Future, 68 MD. L. REV. 889, 899–901 (2009) (reviewing the various standards
courts have used in determining the constitutionality of gun regulations); see also Heller v.
District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010) [hereinafter Heller II]
(“Prior to Heller, [the reasonableness test] was the test used almost uniformly by state
courts.”).
Courts have traditionally used three standards of review in evaluating whether a law
violates a constitutional right: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scru-
tiny.  Rational basis is the most deferential standard of review, requiring that a law have “a
rational relationship” to a “legitimate governmental purpose” to be valid.  Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).  Laws are almost always upheld under this standard of review,
which the Court applies to economic and social legislation.  Goldberg, supra, at 897.  Inter-
mediate scrutiny requires that legislation be “substantially related” to “important govern-
mental objectives” to survive review.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  The Court
applies intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications and content-neutral speech regula-
tions.  Goldberg, supra, at 897–98.  Finally, the highest level of review is strict scrutiny,
which requires that a law “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government in-
terest.”  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  The Court
has applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications, content-based speech restrictions, and
the free exercise of religion.  Goldberg, supra, at 893–94.
For a thorough discussion of standards of review, see Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second
Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 82 S.C. L. REV. 547, 556–64 (2009), and Goldberg, supra, at 892–99.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR406.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-JUN-11 11:01
2011] IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD 1137
is a reasonable method of regulating the right to bear arms.”59  The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for instance, upheld a concealed carry
law as “a reasonable exercise of the state’s inherent police powers.”60
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 2004 noted that even when
state courts found the right to bear arms to be fundamental, “a strict
scrutiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test.”61
As long as it did not work an absolute ban on gun possession, a regula-
tion almost always survived the reasonableness test.62  The United
States Supreme Court in 1980 applied rational basis review in uphold-
ing a statute that prohibited felons from possessing a firearm, noting
that such a law is constitutional as long as “there is some rational basis
for the statutory distinctions made . . . or . . . they have some relevance
to the purpose for which the classification is made.”63
B. Heller and McDonald Established an Individual Right to Keep
and Bear Arms in the Home but Failed to Set a Standard
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment protects the individual right to keep and bear
arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense.64  The Court ap-
plied this right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
McDonald v. Chicago.65  In both cases, the Court hedged its holding by
laying out a laundry list of presumptively lawful gun regulations.66
Neither case, however, provided a standard of review to guide lower
courts in analyzing existing gun regulations under the new individual
Second Amendment right.67
59. Winkler, supra note 39, at 717. R
60. State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 346 (Wis. 2003).
61. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004).
62. See Winkler, supra note 39, at 718 (“Under the reasonable regulation standard, R
courts uphold all but the most arbitrary and excessive laws.”).
63. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (alterations in original) (quoting
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
65. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
66. See id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (reiterating the assurances of Heller); Heller, 554
U.S. at 626–27 (explaining that “nothing in our opinion should . . . cast any doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms”).
67. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (rejecting Justice Breyer’s pro-
posed interest-balancing test in Heller but not setting a standard of its own); Heller, 554 U.S.
at 634–36 (discussing the dissent’s criticism that the majority did not set a standard of
review and concluding that “since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examina-
tion of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field”).
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Heller invalidated a District of Columbia law that effectively
banned the possession of handguns in the home.68  The ban was one
of the most restrictive in the country.69  Conducting a historical in-
quiry into the original understanding of the Second Amendment, the
Court found that the Amendment “conferred an individual right to
keep and bear arms”70 and that this right “belongs to all Americans,”
not just members of a militia.71  The Court held that citizens must be
permitted “to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-de-
fense”72 but limited its holding to the possession of guns in the home,
stating that “whatever else [the holding] leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”73  The
Court stated that the home is “where the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute,”74 and that “the absolute prohibi-
tion of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home” is not
constitutional.75
Heller emphasized that its holding did not invalidate all gun regu-
lations.  The Court noted that the Second Amendment right is “not
unlimited” and is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatso-
ever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”76 Heller
attempted to sketch out some of the boundaries of permissible regula-
tions and created what some scholars have called a “safe harbor” for
certain gun laws.77  The Court noted that the majority of nineteenth
century courts that considered the prohibition of carrying concealed
weapons held bans to be lawful under the Second Amendment or
state constitutions.78  The Court stated that prohibitions on carrying
“dangerous and unusual weapons” would continue to be lawful, as
would prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, and laws imposing condi-
68. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
69. See id. at 629 (noting that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close
to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban”).
70. Id. at 595.
71. Id. at 581.
72. Id. at 630.
73. Id. at 635.
74. Id. at 628.
75. Id. at 636.
76. Id. at 626.
77. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower
Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
78. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.79  Further,
the Court stated that this list of “presumptively lawful regulatory mea-
sures” was exemplary and not “exhaustive.”80
McDonald v. Chicago extended Heller to state regulation by holding
that the individual right to possess a handgun in the home for self-
defense applies against the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.81  The plaintiffs in McDonald challenged a Chicago law that pro-
hibited individuals from possessing a firearm unless they had a valid
registration certificate.82  The law further prohibited the registration
of most handguns, effectively banning handgun possession in the
city.83  The plaintiffs also challenged an Oak Park, Illinois, law that
made it “unlawful for any person to possess . . . any firearm.”84  The
McDonald Court affirmed Heller’s holding that the Second Amend-
ment guarantees the rights of individuals to possess handguns in the
home for self-defense and held that right to be “deeply rooted in this
79. Id. at 626–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 627 n.26.
81. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion).  While a majority of the Court
agreed that the Second Amendment applies against the states, the Court could not agree
on which provision of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Second Amendment against
the states.  Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, stated that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment. Id.  Justice Thomas con-
curred in the judgment, stating that he believed the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges
or Immunities Clause made the right enforceable against the states through the Second
Amendment. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).  In a concurrence, Justice Scalia defended the majority’s reliance on history to find
the right to keep and bear arms to be fundamental, and he criticized the dissenting Justices
for favoring “a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion
can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.” Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that using a rigid historical test to determine funda-
mental rights was unfaithful to the Constitution. Id. at 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He
stated that the Framers assigned to future generations the task of giving concrete meaning
to the term “liberty” and that liberty does not include the right to keep and bear arms. Id.
at 3099, 3109.  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, also dis-
sented, finding that Heller’s conclusion that self-defense was the central component of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was based on a misreading of history. Id.
at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote that “the Framers did not write the
Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense,” and there is
no evidence that such an idea is deeply rooted in the nation’s history or tradition. Id. at
3136.  Therefore, he wrote, the Second Amendment is not a fundamental right and ought
not be incorporated. Id.
82. Id. at 3026 (plurality opinion) (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-040(a)
(2009)).
83. Id. (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-050(c)).
84. Id. (quoting OAK PARK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 27-2-1 (2007); 27-1-1 (2009)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
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Nation’s history and tradition.”85  As such, according to the plurality,
the right is fundamental and must be incorporated under the Four-
teenth Amendment to apply against the states.86
Even in finding the right to keep and bear arms in the home to
be fundamental, the McDonald plurality, like the Heller majority, cau-
tioned that the right can be limited by the state.87  The plurality as-
sured that it was not casting doubt on the “longstanding regulatory
measures” identified as lawful in Heller and stated that “incorporation
does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”88  The plurality also
allowed for state and local experimentation with “reasonable firearms
regulations” to continue.89 McDonald, like Heller, focused its discus-
sion on the possession of handguns in the home.  In its majority opin-
ion, the McDonald Court described individual self-defense as “the
central component of the Second Amendment right”90 and noted the
need to exercise this right is “most acute” in the home, to protect
“self, family, and property.”91
The Heller majority and McDonald plurality suggested that a histor-
ical inquiry could help determine the scope of the Second Amend-
ment right.  The Heller Court stated that “it has always been widely
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”92  Specifically, Heller noted
that in accordance “with the historical understanding of the scope of
the right,” the Second Amendment protects only weapons “typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”93 that were “in
common use at the time”94 of ratification, 1791.95  Therefore, the Sec-
ond Amendment does not protect short-barreled shotguns, for in-
stance, because they were not in common use in 1791.96
85. Id. at 3036 (majority opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 3046.
88. Id. at 3047.
89. Id. at 3046 (quoting Brief of the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 23, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (Nos. 08-1497 & 08-1521)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
90. Id. at 3036 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
92. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
93. Id. at 625.
94. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95. SOL BLOOM, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
62 (1941).
96. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
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Despite establishing this historical inquiry, neither Heller nor Mc-
Donald identified which standard of review should be used to evaluate
gun regulations of a more recent vintage that do not pass the histori-
cal test.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Heller, acknowledged
that the District’s handgun ban would pass rational basis review.97  He
stated, however, that rational basis, the lowest level of review, would be
inappropriate for “a specific, enumerated right” such as the right to
keep and bear arms.98  He also rejected Justice Breyer’s proposal for
an “interest-balancing” test that would weigh an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms against the state’s need to provide for public
safety.99  Justice Scalia wrote, “We know of no other enumerated con-
stitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a free-
standing ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”100  Justice Scalia did not
identify which form of heightened scrutiny should apply, however,
leaving such a determination for future cases.101
McDonald did not clarify the standard of review debate.  The Mc-
Donald plurality also rejected Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing propo-
sal but did not set forth a standard of its own.102  The Court, however,
did note that “reasonable” gun regulations would continue to be
permissible.103
C. Post-Heller: Courts Search for a Standard While Continuing to
Uphold Gun Regulations
Hundreds of challenges to gun regulations have been filed in the
wake of Heller and McDonald, and lower courts have failed to settle on
a standard of review.  The emerging trend is toward intermediate scru-
tiny,104 but courts have also used strict scrutiny, a reasonableness stan-
97. Id. at 628 n.27.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 635 (“But since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination
of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”).
102. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hile
[Justice Breyer’s] opinion in Heller recommended an interest-balancing test, the Court spe-
cifically rejected that suggestion.”).  Justice Stevens criticized McDonald’s failure to establish
a standard in his dissent, warning that the Court was inviting an avalanche of challenges to
state and local gun laws that lower courts would have to decide “under a standard of review
we have not even established.” Id. at 3115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 3046 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief of the State of Texas et al., supra note
89, at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted). R
104. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, No. 5:10-CV-302 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6370, at *31 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2011) (“This Court joins the majority of other courts
and concludes that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for this
case.”); Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]his court joins numerous
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dard, an undue burden standard, and a hybrid of strict and
intermediate scrutiny.105  As Judge Andre Davis of the Fourth Circuit
noted, “Heller has left in its wake a morass of conflicting lower court
opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged fire-
arms regulations.”106  Despite this confusion, commentators have
noted, “[T]he only consistency in the lower court cases is in the re-
sults. Regardless of the test used, challenged gun laws almost always
survive.”107  Lower courts have not been eager to overturn existing
gun control measures.108  The Fourth Circuit in particular noted its
reluctance to extend gun rights beyond those explicitly granted by
Heller, pointing to the toll exacted by gun violence: “We do not wish to
be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of may-
hem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated
as to Second Amendment rights.”109
1. Regulations That Fall into Heller’s “Safe Harbor” Have Been
Upheld
State and federal courts have easily upheld gun regulations that
fall into Heller’s “safe harbor.”110 Heller did not cast doubt on “long-
standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill,” laws forbidding weapons “in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings,” and “laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”111 Heller also ap-
proved of the “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dan-
gerous and unusual weapons.”112
Regulations that fall squarely under those exceptions have been
upheld.  A number of federal courts have upheld felon-in-possession
bans.113  One court that considered, and rejected, a challenge to the
other courts in concluding that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review.”).
105. Mehr & Winkler, supra note 20, at 2–7 (collecting cases); see infra Part II.C.2. R
106. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688–89 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J., concur-
ring) (determining that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review for a law
banning gun possession for individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors).
107. Mehr & Winkler, supra note 20. R
108. Id.
109. United States v. Masciandaro, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at *48 (4th
Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
110. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 77, at 1248 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
111. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
112. Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. E.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir.) (affirming the consti-
tutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in the context of a challenge to a felon-in-possession stat-
ute), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261
(4th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding a conviction under 18
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felon-in-possession ban stated, “There is no wiggle room to distinguish
the present case from the Supreme Court’s blanket [presumptively
lawful] statement.”114  Bans on gun possession among the mentally ill
have been upheld.115 Heller’s statement approving bans on dangerous
and unusual weapons has been used to uphold a ban on assault weap-
ons.116  Finally, Heller’s approval of gun bans in sensitive places has
been cited to uphold laws banning gun possession on county prop-
erty117 and in national parks.118  The Ninth Circuit, upholding a ban
on guns on county property, noted the statute did “not meaningfully
impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in their homes
with usable firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it.”119  The
Eastern District of Virginia, in upholding a ban on the carrying of
loaded weapons in a vehicle in a national park, also noted that Heller’s
holding was limited to the right to possess arms in the home,120 stat-
ing, “Heller’s dicta makes pellucidly clear that the Supreme Court’s
holding should not be read by lower courts as an invitation to invali-
date the existing universe of public weapons regulations.”121
Lower courts have upheld gun regulations not specifically men-
tioned in Heller by relying on a footnote in Heller stating that its list of
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” was only exemplary and
not meant to be “exhaustive.”122  Courts have used the footnote to
uphold bans on gun possession by drug users and those subject to a
protective order or convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); see also United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1168 (W.D.
Tenn. 2009) (collecting cases).
114. United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 5, 2009).
115. E.g., United States v. McRobie, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 617, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14,
2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4),
which bans gun possession for people who have been committed to a mental institution).
116. E.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181, 194–95 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the
District of Columbia’s firearms registration procedure, prohibition of assault weapons, and
prohibition on large capacity ammunition feeding devices were constitutional in the wake
of Heller).
117. E.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that banning
gun possession on county property falls within Heller’s sensitive places exception), vacated
en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the panel to reconsider in light of
McDonald v. Chicago).
118. E.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790–91 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(upholding a conviction for possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in a national
park by analogizing to Heller’s sensitive places exception), aff’d, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
119. Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 460.
120. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 787–88.
121. Id. at 788.
122. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008).
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The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, along with federal district
courts in Wisconsin and West Virginia, have upheld a federal statute
prohibiting illegal drug users from possessing guns.123  Indeed, drug
users have received little sympathy from the courts on the question of
gun possession.  As the Southern District of Illinois noted, “Put simply,
the Second Amendment does not protect one’s right to possess a fire-
arm to deal illegal drugs.”124
Bans on gun possession among domestic violence misdemeanants
have been upheld by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and by several
federal district courts, often by analogy to the list of persons (felons
and the mentally ill) prohibited from possessing guns under Heller.125
Because domestic violence misdemeanants have been convicted of
crimes of violence, one court held, they “must be added to the list of
‘felons and the mentally ill’ against whom the ‘longstanding prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms’ survive Second Amendment scru-
tiny.”126  Courts have further held that even individuals subject to a
protective order, who have not been convicted of any violent crimes,
can be banned from possessing guns.127
123. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful drug users from possessing guns, is
constitutional); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1027 (2010); United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (un-
published) (same); United States v. Hendrix, No. 09-cr-56-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33756, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2010) (same); United States v. Bumm, No. 2:08-cr-00158,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34264, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 2009) (same).
124. Dowdy v. Cross, No. 10-cv-624-MJR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100810, at *7 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 24, 2010) (emphasis omitted) (upholding a two-level sentence enhancement for de-
fendant whose drug offense included the possession of a firearm).
125. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7005,
2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206
(11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598 (S.D. W. Va. 2010);
United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1228 (D. Utah 2009); United States v.
Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008).
126. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
550, 626 (2008)).
127. E.g., United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 2010) (reversing the dis-
missal of an indictment charging the defendant with three counts of possessing firearms
while subject to a domestic protection order); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556
(LEK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding that Heller does not
make 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bans gun possession among those subject to a protec-
tion order, unconstitutional); United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19559 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (upholding an indictment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)).
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2. Lower Courts Struggle to Settle on a Level of Scrutiny for Gun
Regulations
Although lower courts have upheld virtually all gun regulations
they have considered post-Heller, they have diverged on the standard
of review to apply in such cases.  Some courts have avoided the issue
altogether, deciding the cases without setting a standard of review.
The Seventh Circuit, in upholding a statute that prohibits gun posses-
sion among individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors,
applied intermediate review but explicitly declined to set a broad stan-
dard.  The court stated, “[W]e need not get more deeply into the
‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”128  Other courts have been more bold,
with several using strict scrutiny, some using a reasonableness test, and
still others using an undue burden test.129  The majority of courts to
announce a standard of review have employed intermediate scrutiny,
which is emerging as a clear favorite in the lower courts for Second
Amendment challenges.130
The courts that have settled on intermediate scrutiny have gener-
ally done so for two reasons.  First, these courts have argued that Hel-
ler’s list of presumptively lawful regulations is inconsistent with strict
scrutiny.131  The District Court for the District of Columbia stated that
strict scrutiny “would not square” with Heller’s list of presumptively law-
ful regulatory measures132 but noted that “some form of heightened
scrutiny is necessary in light of the fact that the right at issue is a spe-
cific, constitutionally enumerated right.”133  The court settled on in-
termediate scrutiny.134  Second, courts have applied intermediate
128. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 131–65. R
130. See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, No. 5:10-CV-302 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6370, at *31 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2011) (upholding a Georgia law that banned the
possession of weapons in places of worship and asserting that “[t]his Court joins the major-
ity of other courts and concludes that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
scrutiny for this case”); Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 09CV2371-IEG (BGS), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878, at *23–24 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (noting that “a majority of
cases citing to McDonald and employing some form of heightened scrutiny . . . have em-
ployed intermediate scrutiny”).
131. E.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s
description of a list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures is at least implicitly incon-
sistent with strict scrutiny”); United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (W.D.
Pa. 2009) (adopting intermediate scrutiny after observing that “the [Heller] Court’s willing-
ness to presume the validity of several types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with
the adoption of a strict scrutiny standard of review”), aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011).
132. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2010).
133. Id. at 186.
134. Id.
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scrutiny in cases where the challenged regulation falls outside of the
core right identified in Heller.  One court, upholding a ban on carry-
ing weapons in places of worship, noted, “[T]he burden imposed by
this law falls at least one level outside the core right recognized in
Heller for a law abiding individual to keep and carry a firearm for the
purpose of self defense in the home.”135
Courts applying intermediate scrutiny have also relied on Heller’s
statement that the Supreme Court “elevate[d] above all other inter-
ests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-
fense of hearth and home.”136  Noting the Court’s emphasis on law-
abiding citizens, lower courts applying intermediate scrutiny have up-
held felon-in-possession bans,137 domestic violence misdemeanant
bans,138 and laws banning gun possession by drug users139—all of
which, by definition, target people who have broken a law.
Several courts, post-Heller, have applied strict scrutiny to gun reg-
ulations.140  But, even under this highest level of scrutiny, the courts
have upheld the challenged regulation in every instance.  Two federal
district courts upheld a statute prohibiting gun possession among in-
dividuals subject to a protective order.141  The courts reasoned that
the government interest in preventing domestic violence was compel-
ling and that the statute was narrowly tailored in that it applied only to
those who were subject to court-issued protective orders.142  Another
federal district court, considering a challenge to a federal statute
prohibiting persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors
from possessing guns, applied strict scrutiny because “the Heller Court
described the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right,”
135. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *32.
136. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
137. E.g., United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234, at *7
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (finding the federal felon-in-possession ban to be constitutional).
138. E.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that
domestic violence misdemeanants do not have a right to possess a gun in their home);
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (same), cert. denied, No. 10-
7005, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d
580, 598 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (same).
139. E.g., United States v. Chafin, No. 2:08-00129, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95809, at *7 n.3
(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 18, 2008), aff’d per curiam, No. 09-4098, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7713 (4th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2011).
140. E.g., United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556 (LEK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148,
at *5–6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (upholding a federal statute banning individuals subject to
a protective order from possessing guns as “narrowly tailored” to serve the “compelling
government interest” of reducing domestic violence); United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-
CR-004S, 2009 WL 667229, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (same).
141. Erwin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148, at *5–6; Montalvo, 2009 WL 667229, at *3.
142. Erwin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148, at *5–6; Montalvo, 2009 WL 667229, at *3.
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and, according to the court, “where fundamental rights are at stake,
strict scrutiny is to be applied.”143  Applying strict scrutiny, the court
found a compelling government interest in protecting domestic part-
ners and children from gun violence.144  The statute was narrowly tai-
lored to further this interest because it affected only those who had
been convicted of using, attempting to use, or threatening to use phys-
ical force on domestic partners or children.145
A Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion later vacated, proposed
using a hybrid of strict and intermediate scrutiny for gun regula-
tions.146  For laws that “severely burden the core Second Amendment
right of armed defense” in the home, strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied.147 For laws that do not burden that core right, however, that are
“several steps removed from the core constitutional right identified in
Heller,” intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.148  In a move showing
how fluid and unsettled the standard of review debate remains, the
Seventh Circuit, en banc, vacated the panel’s hybrid approach and
instead applied intermediate scrutiny to domestic violence misde-
meanant cases, upholding the prohibition as substantially related to
an important government objective, but declining to set a broad rule
to be followed in other cases.149
The Fourth Circuit endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s original hy-
brid approach, even after it had been vacated.150  The Fourth Circuit
held that an individual convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor
falls outside of the protection of the core right identified in Heller—
“the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a
weapon for self-defense.”151  Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for
domestic violence misdemeanants and “similarly situated persons,”
the Fourth Circuit held, because such individuals are not “law-abid-
ing” and thus fall outside of the core Heller right.152  The court re-
manded the case, however, because it found the government had not
143. United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009). Heller, in
fact, did not describe the right as fundamental but as an “enumerated constitutional right.”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
144. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. at 1233.
145. Id. at 1235.
146. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812–13 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614
F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7005, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21,
2011).
147. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 812.
148. Id. at 812–13.
149. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642.
150. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010).
151. Id. at 683.
152. Id.
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met its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the important
goal of reducing domestic violence and the statute’s “permanent dis-
armament of all domestic-violence misdemeanants.”153
Several courts have used or suggested an “undue burden” test.154
Such a test, based on the principle that “not every law which makes a
right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that
right,”155 provides that a law is permissible so long as it does not have
the purpose or “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path” of
the person seeking to exercise his right.156  The Ninth Circuit used an
undue burden test in upholding a local ordinance prohibiting guns
on government property, noting the statute did “not meaningfully im-
pede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in their
homes.”157  A California appellate court upheld a statute prohibiting
the carrying of loaded guns in public places under the undue burden
test, finding the statute “does not burden the core Second Amend-
ment right announced in Heller—‘the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home’—to any signifi-
cant degree.”158
Finally, some state courts interpreting state constitutional provi-
sions regarding the right to bear arms have employed a “reasonable
regulation” standard to evaluate gun laws post-Heller.159  Such a stan-
dard “asks whether a law effectively destroys or nullifies the ability of
law-abiding people to possess firearms for self-defense.  If so, the law is
unconstitutional; if not, the law is deemed to be only a regulation, not
a prohibition.”160  Since the nineteenth century, state courts have tra-
ditionally used a reasonable regulation standard in evaluating gun
laws under state constitutional provisions.161  Several state courts have
continued to use the standard post-Heller and have found, for in-
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a county
ordinance banning carrying guns on county property “does not meaningfully impede the
ability of individuals to defend themselves in their homes with usable firearms, the core of
the right as Heller analyzed it”), vacated en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (instructing
the panel to reconsider in light of McDonald v. Chicago); People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th
568, 577 n.5 (2008) (upholding a statute banning the carrying of loaded firearms in public
places under “any conceivable articulation” of an undue burden standard), cert. denied,
2009 Cal. LEXIS 2979 (Mar. 18, 2009).
155. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
156. Id. at 877.
157. Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 460.
158. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 577 (emphasis omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Mehr & Winkler, supra note 20, at 6–7. R
160. Id. at 6–7.
161. Id.
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stance, that a state felon-in-possession statute was “a reasonable regula-
tion which is ‘fairly related to the preservation of public peace and
safety.’”162  But because the reasonable regulation standard has
proven to be highly deferential to legislatures,163 at least one federal
judge stated that it could not be the standard intended by the Heller
Court.164  That judge, on the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, found that “the reasonableness test would subject the contested
provisions to a more lenient measure of scrutiny than that envisioned
by the Heller Court,” and so the reasonableness test could not be ap-
plied to firearm regulations in the post-Heller era.165
3. Concealed Carry Laws Represent the Next Battleground in Gun
Law Challenges
While lower courts have fairly easily disposed of challenges to gun
laws specifically mentioned in Heller’s laundry list of presumptively
lawful regulations, they have struggled more with regulations not in-
cluded in the Heller list or covered by its historical test.  As one federal
district court observed, “Challenges to other statutes [not mentioned
in Heller] have proven more complicated.”166  Statutes that fall outside
of Heller include state bans on the concealed or open carrying of fire-
arms167 and federal bans on gun possession by individuals convicted
of domestic violence misdemeanors168 and among individuals who
have been dishonorably discharged from the military.169  Concealed
carry laws present a challenge to courts because they affect all citizens,
including the “law-abiding, responsible” citizen at the heart of the self-
defense right recognized in Heller.170
162. State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Britt v. State,
681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2007)), appeal dismissed and review denied, 689 S.E.2d 395 (2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3428, aff’d, 700 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. 2010); see also Students for Con-
cealed Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., No. 09CA1230, 2010 Colo.
App. LEXIS 541, at *29 (Apr. 15, 2010) (explaining that “the reasonable exercise test . . .
not the rational basis test, is the appropriate test” for evaluating gun regulations under the
Colorado Constitution).
163. See Winkler, supra note 39, at 719 (“Like rational basis, the reasonable regulation R
standard tends to be, more than anything else, shorthand for broad judicial deference.”).
164. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010).
165. Id. at 181, 186 (upholding, under intermediate scrutiny, a firearms registration
scheme, a prohibition on assault weapons, and a ban on large capacity ammunition feed-
ing devices).
166. United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to affirm the indictment of a domestic violence misdemeanant).
167. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b)(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
169. Id. § 922(g)(6).
170. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 577, 635 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR406.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-JUN-11 11:01
1150 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:1131
In the state and federal courts that have entertained challenges to
concealed carry laws, the courts upheld the laws in every case.  The
courts have observed that Heller tacitly condoned concealed carry laws
when it stated, in dicta, “[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to
consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state ana-
logues.”171  The District Court for the District of Nebraska, for exam-
ple, stated that “states can prohibit the carrying of a concealed
weapon without violating the Second Amendment.”172  A federal
court in West Virginia similarly found that the state’s concealed carry
prohibition “continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regula-
tory authority notwithstanding the Second Amendment.”173
Concealed and open carry prohibitions have also been upheld by
state courts in California and Maryland.  An intermediate appellate
court in California used Heller’s concealed carry language to conclude,
“[g]iven this implicit approval of concealed firearm prohibitions, we
cannot read Heller to have altered the courts’ longstanding under-
standing that such prohibitions are constitutional.”174  The California
court also relied on the 1897 Supreme Court case Robertson v. Baldwin,
which stated that concealed carry laws did not infringe the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.175
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a state law that prohib-
ited the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun without a
permit and when outside of one’s home.176  The court held that be-
cause Heller and McDonald both focused on firearms in the home and
the Maryland statute expressly permitted home possession, the statute
was therefore “outside of the scope of the Second Amendment, as ar-
ticulated in Heller and McDonald.”177  The Maryland court firmly re-
jected the suggestion that Heller and McDonald had any application
beyond the home, notwithstanding McDonald’s statement that the
right to keep and bear arms is “most notably for self-defense within
171. Id. at 626.
172. Swait v. Univ. of Neb. at Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96665, at
*6–7 (D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2008) (emphasis omitted).
173. United States v. Hall, No. 2:08-00006, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59641, at *3 (S.D. W.
Va. Aug. 4, 2008) (emphasis omitted), aff’d per curiam, 337 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 774 (2009).
174. People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 575 (2008), cert. denied, 2009 Cal. LEXIS
2979 (Mar. 18, 2009).
175. 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms
(art. 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons . . . .”).
176. Williams v. Maryland, 417 Md. 479, 480, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169 (2011).
177. Id. at 496, 10 A.3d at 1178.
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the home.”178 The Maryland court observed: “[I]t is clear that prohibi-
tion of firearms in the home was the gravamen of the certiorari ques-
tions in both Heller and McDonald and their answers.  If the Supreme
Court, in this dicta, meant its holding to extend beyond home posses-
sion, it will need to say so more plainly.”179  The court did not apply a
standard of review because it did not find that the statute implicated
the Second Amendment.180  A concurring judge stated, however, that
he would have upheld the statute not because it was outside the scope
of the Second Amendment but because it placed a “reasonable restric-
tion[ ]” on the right to bear arms.181
III. ANALYSIS
District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago were hailed as
landmark decisions that reshaped the Second Amendment land-
scape.182  In practice, however, their effect has been muted.  Lower
courts have been reluctant to read Heller and McDonald as inviting
open season on gun regulations.  The District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia summarized the prevailing view in stating, “Heller’s
dicta makes pellucidly clear that the Supreme Court’s holding should
not be read by lower courts as an invitation to invalidate the existing
universe of public weapons regulations.”183  Courts have easily han-
dled many of the challenges to gun laws by referring to Heller’s list of
“presumptively lawful” regulations.184  In some such cases, the courts
have not even found it necessary to apply a standard of review.185  As
courts are confronted with challenges to regulations not mentioned
178. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010) (plurality opinion).
179. Williams, 471 Md. at 476, 10 A.3d at 1177.
180. Id. at 496, 10 A.3d at 1178.
181. Id. at 499, 10 A.3d at 1179 (Murphy, J., concurring).
182. See, e.g., Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1175
(2009) (“In Heller, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court did, indeed, make his-
tory by creating a new Constitutional right to be armed.”); Robert A. Levy, Second Amend-
ment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Heller Paradox, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203,
216 (2010) (“Heller will have nationwide implications.  That result is a big win for common
sense.  More important, that result is a big win for the Constitution.”).
183. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, No.
09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
184. See supra Part II.C.1.
185. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding a
ban on gun possession for domestic violence misdemeanants to be lawful under Heller’s
“longstanding prohibition” exception, without stating a standard of review); Swait v. Univ.
of Neb. at Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96665, at *6–7 (D. Neb. Nov. 25,
2008) (upholding a ban on carrying concealed weapons without stating a standard of
review).
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in Heller, however, they will find it necessary to establish a standard to
govern such cases.
This Part will first explore the challenges presented by gun regu-
lations that do not fall into Heller’s “safe harbor” or meet its historical
test.186  Next, it will show that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review for regulations that do not impinge on the core
right identified in Heller and McDonald.187  Intermediate scrutiny pro-
vides the flexibility and room for local experimentation the Court en-
visioned but also recognizes that lower levels of scrutiny, such as
rational basis or a reasonableness standard, are insufficient for a spe-
cific, enumerated right.  Finally, this Part will propose a framework for
analyzing gun regulations that respects the core Second Amendment
right of possessing a gun in the home for self-defense while allowing
the government space to craft reasonable regulations that affect pos-
session outside the home.188
A. Challenges Presented by Regulations Outside the Heller Safe Harbor
Restrictions on carrying guns in public present unique challenges
because the Supreme Court did not explicitly condone them in Heller
or McDonald. Heller created a group of presumptively lawful regula-
tions: bans on gun possession for felons and the mentally ill, laws for-
bidding weapons in sensitive places, laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms, and laws banning dan-
gerous and unusual weapons.189 Heller also made clear what regula-
tions will not stand: absolute prohibitions on handgun possession in
the home and laws that render guns inoperable in the home.190  That
leaves a sort of twilight zone of regulations that neither fall into the
specifically enumerated safe harbor nor burden the core right of
home possession.
Statutes that fall into this gray area include bans on the public
carrying of firearms,191 bans on gun possession among individuals
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors,192 and bans on gun
possession among individuals who have been dishonorably discharged
from the military.193  The latter two are categorical prohibitions that
186. See infra Part III.A.
187. See infra Part III.B.
188. See infra Part III.C.
189. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
190. Id. at 628–29.
191. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b)(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
193. Id. § 922(g)(6).
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affect only a discrete group of people and can be analogized to Heller’s
approval of felon possession bans.  Courts have extrapolated from Hel-
ler’s endorsement of felon possession bans to hold lawful bans on pos-
session by drug users,194 illegal aliens,195 and domestic violence
misdemeanants.196  All of those cases affected a discrete group of peo-
ple who had violated a law.  In so doing, those individuals placed
themselves outside of mainstream society,197 allowing courts to up-
hold regulations that deprive them of certain rights, such as the Heller-
recognized right to possess guns in their homes.
Concealed carry laws, however, do not discriminate between
groups or disproportionately affect a discrete group: by contrast, con-
cealed carry laws affect everyone, including people who are law-abid-
ing.198  Concealed carry bans, therefore, cannot be sustained on the
categorical exception basis.  Nor can they be sustained on the basis of
a historical inquiry. Heller explained that the Second Amendment
“codified a pre-existing right.”199  Regulations that were common at the
time of ratification, 1791, do not fall within the ambit of the Amend-
ment.  Most gun regulations do not benefit from this historical in-
quiry, however, because they came into effect long after ratification.200
194. E.g., United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpub-
lished) (upholding as constitutional 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which makes it unlawful for
drug users or addicts to possess a gun).
195. E.g., United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8166, at *2–5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (upholding as constitutional 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5),
which makes it unlawful for illegal aliens to possess guns).
196. E.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding as
constitutional 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which makes it unlawful for domestic violence misde-
meanants to possess guns).
197. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 690 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J., concur-
ring) (“Undisputedly, those convicted for having committed violent assaults against cohab-
itants and family members in general, and Chester in particular, are not law-abiding,
responsible citizens.”).
198. See, for example, title 4, section 4-203 of the Maryland Code, which applies to
“persons” with exceptions for law enforcement and the military.
199. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
200. Winkler, supra note 33, at 1563.  One scholar noted, R
One thing the Founders did not do was impose any gun control laws obvi-
ously equivalent to those on the laundry list.  They had no restrictions on the
commercial sales of firearms as such.  Licensing of gun dealers, mandatory back-
ground checks, and waiting periods on gun purchases first arose in the twentieth
century.  Nor did the Founders have bans on guns in schools, government build-
ings, or any other “sensitive place.”  The Founding generation had no laws limit-
ing gun possession by the mentally ill, nor laws denying the right to people
convicted of crimes.  Bans on ex-felons possessing firearms were first adopted in
the 1920s and 1930s, almost a century and a half after the Founding.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Concealed carry laws, for instance, first appeared in the early nine-
teenth century.201
Post-Heller, few courts have seriously addressed the constitutional-
ity of concealed or open carry laws.  The state courts that have consid-
ered the issue have upheld the laws using either no standard of
review202 or the undue burden standard.203  It is unlikely, however,
that federal courts, which have moved toward an intermediate stan-
dard of review for gun regulations,204 would be so lenient.  One of the
first federal courts to evaluate a concealed carry law under Heller up-
held the law in a cursory unpublished opinion, without applying a
standard of review.205 Another district court, also ruling shortly after
Heller was decided, upheld a concealed carry law in a four-page un-
published opinion, again without applying a standard.206  In 2010, the
only other federal court to issue a decision on a concealed carry law
found the law valid under intermediate scrutiny.207  But, that court, in
finding that California’s ban on carrying concealed handguns in pub-
lic was reasonably related to the goal of reducing violence,208 still
warned that “not all concealed weapons bans are presumptively law-
ful.”209  In that case, the court was mollified by the fact that the Cali-
fornia law at issue allowed carrying concealed weapons in public for
immediate self-defense, a period during which danger has presented
itself but before police have arrived.210  Other states’ carry laws, in-
cluding Maryland’s, do not have an exception for immediate self-
defense.211
The challenge presented by gun regulations that fall outside the
Heller core—that is, outside the home—recently divided a Fourth Cir-
201. Cramer, supra note 45, at 150 (noting that the nation’s first concealed weapon R
statute was enacted in Kentucky in 1813).
202. E.g., Williams v. Maryland, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167 (2011).
203. E.g., People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 577 n.5 (2008), cert. denied, 2009 Cal.
LEXIS 2979 (Mar. 18, 2009).
204. See supra Part II.C.2.
205. Swait v. Univ. of Neb. at Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96665, at *6
(D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2008).
206. United States v. Hall, No. 2:08-00006, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59641, at *3 (S.D. W.
Va. Aug. 4, 2008) (emphasis omitted), aff’d per curiam, 337 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 774 (2009).
207. Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 09CV2371-IEG (BGS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130878, at *25–27 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010).
208. Id. at *27.
209. Id. at *18.
210. Id. at *19.
211. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010) (failing to
specify an exception for immediate self-defense).
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cuit panel.212  The court, in affirming a district court ruling upholding
a ban on possessing loaded weapons in motor vehicles on national
parkland, split on whether the case implicated the Second Amend-
ment.213  Judge Wilkinson, writing for the court, found it was unneces-
sary to determine if the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller
applies outside the home: “This case underscores the dilemma faced
by lower courts in the post-Heller world: how far to push Heller beyond
its undisputed core holding.  On the question of Heller’s applicability
outside the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction
from the Court itself.”214  But Judge Niemeyer, writing separately,
found that the Second Amendment was implicated but agreed that
the regulation was constitutional.215  The dispute underlines the un-
certainty faced by even seasoned appellate judges in how to interpret
Heller.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard for Most Gun
Regulations
This Section will first eliminate rational basis and strict scrutiny as
possible standards of review for Second Amendment challenges.  It
will also consider and reject the reasonableness and undue burden
tests.  This Section will then show that intermediate scrutiny is the ap-
propriate standard for reviewing gun regulations.
1. Rational Basis Review and the Reasonableness and Undue Burden
Tests Are Too Lenient for a Fundamental Right
Rational basis review is too deferential a standard to apply to reg-
ulations that infringe on what the Court has recognized as “a specific,
enumerated right,” namely, the right to possess arms in the home for
self-defense.216  Writing for the Supreme Court in Heller, Justice Scalia
ruled out the rational basis test for gun regulations: “Obviously, the
[rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which
a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the free-
dom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to
counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.”217
212. United States v. Masciandaro, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir.
Mar. 24, 2011).
213. Id. at *2–3.
214. Id. at *45.
215. Id. at *27 (Niemeyer, J., writing separately).
216. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
217. Id.
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The reasonableness test also provides too lenient a standard of
review for a right that has now been deemed “fundamental.”218  The
reasonableness test asks if the challenged law is “a reasonable method
of regulating the right to bear arms.”219  Rejecting the reasonableness
for gun regulations, one federal district court judge noted, “The rea-
sonableness test subjects firearms laws to only a marginally more
heightened form of review than rational-basis review.”220  When
“nearly all laws survive the reasonable regulation standard,”221 and it is
largely similar to the rational basis test the Court has rejected, it is too
deferential a standard to apply to “a specific, enumerated right.”222
Similarly, the undue burden standard, which permits laws so long
as they do not place “a substantial obstacle in the path” of the individ-
ual exercising the protected right,223 does not provide the effective
form of heightened scrutiny for which Heller called.  The undue bur-
den test is similar to Justice Breyer’s “interest-balancing” approach,
which was rejected by the Heller and McDonald Courts.  Interest-balanc-
ing, as described by Justice Breyer in Heller, “asks whether the statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important gov-
ernmental interests.”224  Noting the resemblance between interest-bal-
ancing and the undue burden test, one federal judge stated, “[T]his
court strongly doubts that the Heller majority envisioned the undue
burden standard when it left for another day a determination of the
level of scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.”225
2. Strict Scrutiny Is Not the Appropriate Standard Because It Would
Invalidate Heller’s “Presumptively Lawful” Regulations
Strict scrutiny is too stringent a level of review for gun regulations
because (1) Heller and McDonald gave examples of “presumptively law-
ful” gun laws that would most likely fail strict scrutiny; (2) the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is similar in its nature and
language to other guarantees in the Bill of Rights that receive inter-
mediate review, not strict scrutiny; and (3) the McDonald plurality
218. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion).
219. Winkler, supra note 39, at 717. R
220. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010).
221. Winkler, supra note 39, at 718 (finding that in thirty-six of the forty-two states with R
individual right-to-bear-arms guarantees, “no gun control measure has been invalidated in
over half a century under” the reasonable regulation standard).
222. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
223. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
224. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
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pledged that local experimentation with gun regulations would con-
tinue, an outcome at odds with strict scrutiny.
As previously discussed, Heller set forth a list of gun regulations
that remain lawful even under the newly recognized individual right
to keep and bear arms.226  Courts and scholars have agreed that these
presumptively lawful regulations—such as bans on possession of guns
by felons and laws prohibiting guns in sensitive places such as
schools—would likely fail a strict scrutiny test.227  Such laws serve the
compelling interest of protecting public safety,228 but they would
founder on strict scrutiny’s narrowly tailored requirement.  For in-
stance, a law banning felons from possessing guns would fail for being
overly broad.  Not all felons are dangerous and have committed vio-
lent crimes.229  Some have simply embezzled or committed fraud.
Further, banning guns from schools may fail strict scrutiny because,
for some college students, school is home.  A ban on guns in schools
would thus prevent those students from keeping a gun in their
home.230  Such a statute may also lack a tight means-end fit: at least
226. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
227. See id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that under strict scrutiny, the constitu-
tionality of Heller’s presumptively lawful regulations “would be far from clear”); United
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the court did “not see how
the listed laws could be ‘presumptively’ constitutional if they were subject to strict scru-
tiny”), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7005, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (observing that “the Court’s willingness to presume the validity of several
types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with the adoption of a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review”), aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Heni-
gan, supra note 182, at 1197–98 (stating that “the Heller majority . . . implicitly rejected R
strict scrutiny” by describing certain gun control measures as presumptively lawful); Carl-
ton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and
Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379 (2009) (observing that “it is doctrinally
impossible to conclude that strict scrutiny governs Second Amendment claims, while also
upholding” the presumptively lawful exceptions specified in Heller).
228. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (explaining that “the
Government’s general interest in preventing crime is compelling” and that it can some-
times outweigh “the individual’s strong interest in liberty”).
229. See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “most
felons are nonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his record is more likely
than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and violent gun use”).
230. Craven, supra note 8, at 854.  It has been noted, R
By prohibiting gun ownership on campus, colleges have effectively removed any
opportunity for students to own guns in their homes. Removing the option for
having a firearm in the home eliminates the right of college students who live on
campus to exercise their right to keep and bear arms in the same way that re-
sidents of Washington, D.C. were prevented from exercising their right. This indi-
cates that banning gun ownership on campus is an unconstitutional restraint on
the right to bear arms.
Id.
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one author has found there to be a lack of statistical proof that ban-
ning guns from campuses actually makes campuses safer.231
Although the McDonald plurality identified the right to keep and
bear arms as “among those fundamental rights necessary to our system
of ordered liberty,”232 this classification does not automatically trigger
strict scrutiny for infringements on the right.  Indeed, most of the
enumerated Bill of Rights guarantees do not trigger strict scrutiny.233
The Supreme Court has determined that courts do not apply strict
scrutiny to the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures,234 the Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination,235 or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.236  Profes-
sor Adam Winkler concluded, “[S]trict scrutiny is quite rarely applied
to laws burdening the textually guaranteed rights found in the Bill of
Rights.”237  Incorporation does not change the equation.  As Professor
Winkler noted, “All incorporated rights may be fundamental, but not
all incorporated rights trigger strict scrutiny. . . .  Strict scrutiny is only
used in doctrines of two incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights:
the First and Fifth Amendments.”238
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms should be
no exception to this general rule because in several ways it is more
similar to the enumerated rights that receive intermediate scrutiny
than to those that receive strict scrutiny.  For instance, the text of both
the Second and Fourth Amendments suggests a space for state restric-
tions.  The Second Amendment calls for a “well regulated Militia.”239
The Fourth Amendment, which does not receive strict scrutiny,240
protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and, thus, al-
lows for reasonable ones, such as those authorized by a warrant.241
231. Id. at 851.
232. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010) (majority opinion).
233. Mehr & Winkler, supra note 20, at 3–4 (noting that strict scrutiny only applies to R
certain doctrines arising under the First and Fifth Amendments and does not apply at all in
cases arising under the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments).
234. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995).
235. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189–91 (2004).
236. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that for a defendant
to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced—a high bar
that exceeds the relatively easy showing required for individuals challenging statutes evalu-
ated under strict scrutiny).
237. Winkler, supra note 39, at 696. R
238. Adam Winker, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
227, 233 (2006).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
240. Winkler, supra note 238. R
241. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR406.txt unknown Seq: 29 10-JUN-11 11:01
2011] IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD 1159
The First Amendment, on the other hand, contains the absolute lan-
guage “Congress shall make no law.”242 and receives strict scrutiny in
some circumstances.  Content-based speech regulations, which turn
on the subject matter or viewpoint of the regulated speech, receive
strict scrutiny review.243 Content-neutral restrictions, however, which
apply to all speech regardless of subject matter, receive a lesser stan-
dard of review, usually intermediate scrutiny.244
The Second Amendment is more similar to the Fourth Amend-
ment than the First.  It lacks the absolute language of the First
Amendment.  Indeed, Heller acknowledged the right to keep and bear
arms “is not unlimited” and is “not a right to keep and carry any
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever pur-
pose.”245  That language does not suggest the rigor of strict scrutiny.
Finally, McDonald’s endorsement of state and local experimenta-
tion further undermines the case for strict scrutiny.  Justice Alito, writ-
ing for the plurality, approvingly quoted an amicus curiae brief filed
by thirty-eight states, noting that, “[s]tate and local experimentation
with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second
Amendment.”246  Such a statement presupposes a flexible standard of
review, such as intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny’s
blunt force.  Strict scrutiny, famously described as “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact,”247 could imperil a wide array of gun laws—an outcome at
odds with the stated intentions of the Heller majority and McDonald
plurality.248  “[I]ncorporation,” the McDonald plurality declared, “does
242. U.S. CONST. amend I.
243. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“[R]estrictions such as an abso-
lute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest.”).
244. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 653 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] content-neu-
tral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech ordinarily receives intermediate
scrutiny.”).
245. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
246. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (plurality opinion) (alteration
in original) (quoting Brief of the State of Texas et al., supra note 89, at 23) (internal R
quotation marks omitted).
247. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”’).
248. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 (stating, “We identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”); McDon-
ald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (“[I]ncorporation does not imperil every law
regulating firearms.”).
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not imperil every law regulating firearms.”249  Strict scrutiny, however,
would do just that.250
3. Intermediate Scrutiny Provides the Heightened Scrutiny Envisioned
by the Court While Allowing for Public Safety Considerations
Intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review for gun
regulations because it comports with the understanding of a right that
is fundamental but also subject to some amount of restriction, provid-
ing the heightened level of review envisioned by Heller without imper-
iling the universe of gun control laws.  In rejecting rational basis
review, the Heller Court made clear that some form of heightened
scrutiny must apply to gun regulations.  That form of heightened scru-
tiny must be able to account for the existing gun regulations that Hel-
ler deemed “presumptively lawful”251 while respecting the core right
identified by Heller of keeping and bearing arms for self-defense in the
home.252  Intermediate scrutiny, which “by definition, permits [legisla-
tive bodies] to paint with a broader brush than strict scrutiny,”253 pro-
vides that proper fit.
As demonstrated above, the presumptively lawful regulations
identified in Heller would likely fail a strict scrutiny test.254  They
would, however, meet an intermediate standard of review,255  which
requires a law to be substantially related to an important government
interest.256  The District Court for the District of Columbia found that
regulations implicitly endorsed by Heller, such as registration schemes,
survive intermediate review.257  The court, considering a registration
249. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
250. See United States v. Masciandaro, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at *34
(4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011) (“Were we to require strict scrutiny in circumstances such as those
presented here [a challenge to a federal law banning the possession of loaded weapons in
motor vehicles in national parks], we would likely foreclose an extraordinary number of
regulatory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent[ ] armed mayhem’ in
public places and depriving them of ‘a variety of tools for combating that problem.’” (al-
teration in original) (citations omitted)).
251. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
252. Id. at 636.
253. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 191 (D.D.C. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1172 (W.D. Tenn. 2009)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
254. See supra Part III.B.2.
255. See Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (stating that intermediate scrutiny “satisfies the
Heller Court’s directive that courts apply an exacting measure of scrutiny to laws limiting
the exercise of this specific, constitutionally enumerated right, while avoiding the inconsis-
tencies that would arise were it to apply strict scrutiny” (citation omitted)).
256. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
257. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
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requirement in Washington, D.C., noted that under intermediate
scrutiny, “the degree of fit between the registration scheme in this
case and the well-established goal of promoting public safety need not
be perfect; it must only be substantial.”258  The court found that to be
the case, finding “a substantial nexus between the registration require-
ments and the important governmental interest” in promoting public
safety.259
Outside the home, the Second Amendment right to gun posses-
sion comes into conflict with the state’s police powers to protect the
public safety.260  Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review to balance these competing interests.  As the Fourth Circuit
recently noted, “[A]s we move outside the home, firearms rights have
always been more limited, because public safety interests often out-
weigh individual interests in self-defense.”261
The Seventh Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny, found that a
law banning individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors
from possessing guns bore a “substantial relation” to the important
government objective of “preventing armed mayhem.”262  The court
noted the high recidivism rate among those who commit domestic
violence offenses and concluded, “[T]here are substantial benefits in
keeping the most deadly weapons out of the hands of domestic
abusers.”263
The Heller Court itself indicated intermediate scrutiny is the ap-
propriate standard by suggesting that a number of appellate Second
Amendment decisions remain valid.  Justice Stevens, dissenting in Hel-
ler, lamented that the Court was overturning a line of cases built on
United States v. Miller, the Court’s most thorough twentieth century ex-
ploration of the Second Amendment, where the Court adopted a col-
lective rights view.264  Since Miller, Justice Stevens wrote, “hundreds of
judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed
258. Id.
259. Id. at 192–93.
260. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled princi-
ples the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regula-
tions established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the
public safety.”).
261. United States v. Masciandaro, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at *33 (4th
Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
262. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7005,
2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011).
263. Id. at 644.
264. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding, under rational review, a federal statute ban-
ning the transport of short-barreled shotguns because such weapons were not reasonably
related to militia service).
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there,”265 citing cases from each circuit court of appeals.266  Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, responded that those judges may have
read too much into Miller.267  He also stated, however, “In any event, it
should not be thought that the cases decided by these judges would
necessarily have come out differently under a proper interpretation of
the right.”268
This extraordinary admission suggests that much of the twentieth
century case law on gun regulations remains valid precedent, even
under an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.
In the cases Justice Scalia referred to, the courts upheld regulations
that ban the possession of machineguns made after 1986,269 firearms
by people subject to a domestic violence order,270 pipe bombs271 and
sawed-off shotguns,272 as well as regulations requiring the registration
of guns,273 requiring a permit to carry a concealed weapon,274 and
banning felons from possessing firearms.275
To be sure, Justice Scalia did not declare all those gun regula-
tions to be lawful post-Heller, but his openness as to their validity sug-
gests the Court is contemplating applying something less than strict
scrutiny.  The laws held constitutional in those appellate cases re-
present a wide range of regulations, not all of which would survive
strict scrutiny’s narrowly tailored requirement.276  They would, how-
ever, survive a lesser standard of review, as they promote an important
government interest and can likely be shown to substantially relate to
efforts to curb violence.277
Finally, the McDonald plurality’s endorsement of state and local
gun control experimentation is an outcome best reached through the
more flexible standard of intermediate scrutiny.278  As previously
265. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 638 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 638 n.2.
267. Id. at 624 n.24.
268. Id.
269. United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001).
270. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2000).
271. United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 1997).
272. United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
273. Wright, 117 F.3d at 1274; United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1992).
274. Thomas v. City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
275. United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 549 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
276. Felon possession bans, for example, may fail for overinclusiveness because many
felons have not committed violent crimes. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. R
277. See, e.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 191–92 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that a gun
registration requirement survives intermediate scrutiny because it accomplishes “important
public safety goals”).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 246–50. R
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noted,279 the plurality wanted to preserve some room for legislatures
to maneuver to find the gun regulations that best meet their particu-
lar circumstances.280  Strict scrutiny would not allow for such varia-
tion.  Intermediate scrutiny, therefore, is the appropriate level of
review for gun regulations.
C. A Framework for Evaluating Challenged Gun Regulations
This Section will propose a three-step inquiry for evaluating chal-
lenges to gun regulations and then apply that test to concealed carry
bans.  The first step is to determine whether a gun regulation has a
historical basis that indicates it was outside the scope of the Second
Amendment at the time of ratification, in 1791.  If a gun regulation
was outside the scope of the Amendment, the regulation is valid be-
cause it is not implicated by the Amendment’s guarantee.  If, however,
a historical basis does not exist for the regulation, step two of the in-
quiry calls for a determination of whether the challenged regulation
burdens the core Second Amendment right, identified in Heller, of
keeping and bearing arms in the home for self-defense.  This determi-
nation requires the application of a means-end scrutiny test.  If that
core right is implicated, strict scrutiny should be applied because the
Court in Heller and McDonald found bans on home possession to be
practically per se unconstitutional.281  But if the core right is not im-
plicated, then intermediate scrutiny should be applied because the
core Heller and McDonald right is not in play.  The third step is to apply
the appropriate level of scrutiny to the challenged regulation.
1. A Three-Step Inquiry for Gun Regulations
The first step in the inquiry is to examine the historical nature of
the challenged regulation.  The Third and Fourth Circuits have en-
dorsed a historical test.282  The Fourth Circuit described the inquiry as
follows:
279. See supra Part III.B.2.
280. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[s]tate
and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the
Second Amendment.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of the State of Texas et al.,
supra note 89, at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted)). R
281. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding that “the en-
shrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.
These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
home.”); McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (majority opinion) (noting
that “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right”
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599)).
282. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678–79 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011).
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The first question is whether the challenged law imposes a
burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee.  This historical inquiry seeks to de-
termine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification.  If it
was not, then the challenged law is valid.283
The court reasoned that the Second Amendment codified a pre-ex-
isting right to bear arms—the right as it existed at the time of ratifica-
tion.  As the Heller Court noted, “Constitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people
adopted them.”284  Therefore, if certain firearms restrictions were in
place at the time of ratification, they were understood by the people
to be outside the scope of the Amendment and, accordingly, are valid
restrictions.  In that case, the inquiry ends.  Most firearms restrictions
in effect today were not common at ratification, however, and thus
cannot be shown to be outside the scope of the Second
Amendment.285
The second step is to ask if the challenged regulation burdens
the core right protected by the Second Amendment.  That right, iden-
tified in Heller, is the right to “use arms in defense of hearth and
home.”286  A regulation that amounts to an absolute ban of gun pos-
session in the home, such as the District of Columbia’s, is a burden on
this core right.  By the Court’s own acknowledgement, few laws will
work such a severe restriction that they burden the core Second
Amendment right.  Regarding the challenged law in Heller, the Court
stated, “Few laws in the history of our nation have come close to the
severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”287  In McDonald, the
Court invalidated two other laws that were similar to the District’s ban:
the restrictions in Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois, that effectively
banned handgun possession in the home.288  Those laws were invali-
dated because they impinged on the core right recognized in Heller.289
If a regulation burdens the core Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms in the home for self-defense, then strict scrutiny should
be applied, and the law will likely be invalidated.
Restrictions that do not impinge on that core right, however,
should receive a different, lower level of review—intermediate scru-
283. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
285. See supra note 200. R
286. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
287. Id. at 629.
288. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
289. See id. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
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tiny.  A law that prohibits, for instance, carrying guns in places of wor-
ship or obliterating serial numbers from guns would not burden the
core right of home possession.290  There is precedent for this two-
track approach in First Amendment jurisprudence.  For example, con-
tent-based restrictions on speech in a public forum trigger strict scru-
tiny,291 but others receive intermediate scrutiny292 or no protection at
all.293  As the Third Circuit observed, “[T]he right to free speech, an
undeniably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several
standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and
the type of speech at issue.  We see no reason why the Second Amend-
ment would be any different.”294  The Fourth Circuit cited the Third
Circuit and came to a similar conclusion: “[W]e agree with those who
advocate looking to the First Amendment as a guide in developing a
standard of review for the Second Amendment.”295
It follows that challenges to gun regulations can trigger differing
levels of review depending on how severely the challenged regulation
impacts the core Heller-recognized right of home possession.  Since
Heller, courts have largely confronted challenges to laws that are less
restrictive than the absolute handgun possession ban at issue in Heller.
Accordingly, the courts have used a standard of review lower than
strict scrutiny to evaluate and uphold laws that do not burden the core
Heller right.  These decisions concern laws that ban domestic violence
misdemeanants296 and drug users297 from possessing guns; laws that
290. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (upholding a
statute prohibiting the possession of guns with obliterated serial numbers because such a
statute “does not come close to [the] level of infringement” of the Second Amendment
right found in Heller), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia,
No.5:10-CV-302 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *32 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2011) (up-
holding a statute banning carrying weapons in places of worship as “one level outside the
core right recognized in Heller”).
291. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 404 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that “the strict scrutiny standard applie[s] in a case involving a First
Amendment challenge to a content-based statute”).
292. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 653 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] content-neu-
tral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech ordinarily receives intermediate
scrutiny . . . .”).
293. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting, “There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.” (footnote omitted)).
294. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96–97 (citation omitted).
295. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
296. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied,
No. 10-7005, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011).
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forbid obliterating the serial numbers on guns;298 laws that ban assault
weapons;299 and laws that ban loaded guns in motor vehicles in na-
tional parks300 and in post office parking lots.301  As the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted, “Laws that restrict the right to bear arms are subject to
meaningful review, but unless they severely burden the core Second
Amendment right of armed defense, strict scrutiny is unwarranted.”302
The third and final step in the inquiry is to apply the appropriate
level of heightened review—strict or intermediate scrutiny—depend-
ing on whether the challenged regulation burdens the core Second
Amendment right.  Absolute bans on home possession will almost cer-
tainly fail under strict scrutiny, as the bans in Chicago and Oak Park
failed.303  Regulations that operate outside the home or that target a
defined group, however, will likely survive intermediate scrutiny as
long as the government can show the laws are substantially related to
preserving public safety.304
2. Applying the Three-Step Inquiry to Concealed Carry Prohibitions
Concealed carry laws represent a significant challenge to courts
trying to interpret the Heller and McDonald opinions because (1) such
laws were not listed among the presumptively lawful regulatory mea-
sures sanctioned by the Court and (2) the laws burden all members of
society.  For these reasons, they are a useful test of the three-step in-
quiry outlined above.  The few courts that have considered concealed
carry prohibitions have upheld them based on Heller’s apparent ap-
proval of such regulations.305  The Heller Court stated that “[t]he ma-
jority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the
Second Amendment or state analogues.”306
297. United States v. Bumm, No. 2:08-cr-00158, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34264, at *8–9
(S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 2009); United States v. Hendrix, No. 09-cr-56-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33756, at *5–7 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2010).
298. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.
299. Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181, 186 (D.D.C. 2010).
300. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781, 789 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d,
No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).
301. United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 876 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (un-
published), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010).
302. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7005, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011).
303. See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (majority opinion) (invali-
dating Chicago and Oak Park, Ill., laws that were similar to the District of Columbia’s ban
on handgun possession in the home).
304. See supra Part III.B.3.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 171–73. R
306. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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Lower courts, however, should be wary of reading too much into
this statement.  The two nineteenth century cases cited by Heller for its
concealed carry pronouncement both permitted the open carrying of
weapons in public, thereby providing citizens with a way to carry a gun
for self-defense.307  Today, many states that prohibit concealed carry-
ing, such as Maryland, also prohibit open carrying.308  Further, as one
circuit judge has noted, “[W]e cannot read Heller’s dicta in a way that
swallows its holdings.”309  The Court’s cryptic statement on concealed
carry bans cannot be taken as an endorsement of such bans or a rea-
son to exempt them from any standard of review.  Carry laws must be
rigorously evaluated under the appropriate level of scrutiny to deter-
mine their constitutionality.
The first step in the analysis proposed here asks if a historical
basis for the regulation would take it outside the ambit of the Second
Amendment.  As noted previously, concealed carry laws did not ap-
pear until the nineteenth century, so they cannot be exempt from the
Second Amendment as it was understood upon ratification.310
The next step is to determine if concealed carry laws burden the
core right identified in Heller and McDonald—the right to possess guns
in the home for self-defense.311  They do not.  Concealed carry laws
are public safety measures that concern the carrying of guns in public.
As such, they do not affect the right to possess guns in the home.
Maryland’s carry law, for instance, expressly permits wearing, carrying,
or transporting a handgun in one’s home or business.312  The ques-
tion before the Court in Heller was whether a city could ban handgun
possession in the home, and the Court limited its holding to that is-
sue.313  Concealed carry bans do not affect one’s ability to defend the
hearth or home.314  As such, they do not burden the core right recog-
307. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (holding that the state may ban the con-
cealed carrying of weapons but bans on open carrying of weapons are “in conflict with the
Constitution”); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (holding that a concealed
weapons ban “interfered with no man’s right to carry arms . . . ‘in full open view’”).
308. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(a)(1)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010)
(stating that a person may not “wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or
open, on or about the person”).
309. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 654 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, No. 10-7005, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2138 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011).
310. Cramer, supra note 45, at 150. R
311. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636; McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
312. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b)(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010) (stating that
the concealed carry ban does not prohibit “the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a
handgun by a person on real estate that the person owns or leases or where the person
resides or within the confines of a business establishment that the person owns or leases”).
313. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
314. See supra note 312. R
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nized in Heller.  Concealed carry laws, therefore, should receive inter-
mediate scrutiny.
The third and final step is to apply intermediate scrutiny to con-
cealed carry laws to determine if they are substantially related to an
important government objective.  Certainly, promoting public safety
and reducing violence are important government objectives.315  The
more challenging question is whether concealed carry laws are sub-
stantially related to that objective.  Some studies have found it is not
possible to determine if there is a link between concealed carry
prohibitions and crime rates.316  Other writers have suggested that
carrying concealed weapons in public creates a risk of collateral dam-
age to innocent bystanders317 and leads to the possibility that argu-
ments will escalate into violence.318 Although the social science is not
conclusive, it is instructive here because intermediate scrutiny only re-
quires a substantial fit, not a perfect one.
Furthermore, in urban areas where gun violence is a particular
problem, the substantial relationship between concealed carry bans
and public safety may be easier to prove than it would be in rural
areas.319  Indeed, Justice Alito, writing for the plurality in McDonald,
noted that incorporating the Second Amendment to apply against the
states “limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solu-
tions to social problems that suit local needs and values.”320  There-
fore, a Maryland court could find a substantial relationship between
preventing violence and banning the carrying of concealed weapons
within the state’s borders or in a particular urban area within the
state, while a court in North Dakota could find that no such relation-
ship exists.  Such an outcome would be permissible under—and is
even suggested by—Justice Alito’s reasoning.
In the end, applying intermediate scrutiny to concealed carry
laws will involve considerations of local factors that will vary across the
315. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling
state interest’ in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” (quoting De
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960))).
316. See COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 150 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds.,
2005) (“[W]ith the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there is a causal
link between the passage of right-to-carry laws and crime rates.”).
317. Anderson, supra note 58, at 590. R
318. Winkler, supra note 33, at 1572. R
319. See, e.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 192–93 (2010) (accepting the District of
Columbia’s argument that rigorous firearms regulations meet an important government
interest in protecting public safety “because the District is a densely populated, urban
locale”).
320. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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country.  Some cities and states may be able to show that concealed
carry prohibitions will help them keep their citizens safe, meeting the
substantial fit required by intermediate scrutiny.  Other cities and
states may not be able to make such an argument, or even want to.
Strict scrutiny would destroy such variance.  Intermediate scrutiny per-
mits it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Heller and McDonald represent a turning point in Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  In these cases, the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time an individual right to keep and bear arms, and the
Court detached the Second Amendment from its longstanding associ-
ation with militia service.321  Even as Heller and McDonald were
landmark decisions, however, they were also cautious decisions.  The
Court took pains to note that it was recognizing only the right to keep
and bear arms in the home for self-defense.322  The Court declined to
set a standard of review to guide lower courts but noted that some
longstanding gun regulations—such as bans on gun possession
among felons and the mentally ill, and bans on guns in sensitive
places such as schools—continue to be lawful.323  All other explora-
tions of the newfound Second Amendment right would have to wait
for another day.324
In many lower courts, that day has arrived.325  Difficult Second
Amendment cases, such as challenges to laws that prohibit the con-
cealed carrying of guns, are now before state and federal judges.326
This Comment has proposed a framework for evaluating those cases
that considers the historical nature of the regulation and the burden
it places on the core Second Amendment right to possess arms in the
home for self-defense.327  Regulations that burden the core right of
self-defense in the home should receive strict scrutiny.  Regulations
that do not burden that core right should receive intermediate scru-
321. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us no
doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to keep and bear arms.”).
322. Id. at 635–36; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044 (plurality opinion).
323. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
324. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“But since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field . . . .”).
325. See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 20 (noting that state and federal courts have de- R
cided more than 200 gun regulation challenges since Heller was decided).
326. E.g., Woollard v. Sheridan, No. JFM-10-2068, 2010 WL 5463109 (D. Md. Dec. 29,
2010).
327. See supra Part III.C.1.
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tiny because they implicate other interests, notably public safety.  This
framework finds common ground with the analysis used in First
Amendment cases, where different types of speech receive different
levels of review.328
Under this proposal, regulations that stop short of absolute bans
on possession of guns in the home would likely pass constitutional
muster so long as the regulations have a substantial relationship to
improving public safety and preventing violence.  Moreover, few regu-
lations are so severe that they work an absolute ban on home posses-
sion.329  Ultimately, then, Heller and McDonald may push courts—and
America—toward a sensible medium: individuals may possess guns in
the home for self-defense, but outside the home, states may restrict
gun possession to promote public safety.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 292–95. R
329. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to
the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”).
